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TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Richard Gordon 
At least since the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) first        
published its Forty Recommendations, financial institutions in FATF-
compliant jurisdictions have been required to implement preventive 
measures that require FIs to identify customers, establish client profiles, 
monitor for unusual transactions, review those transactions to see if there 
was suspicion that they involved the proceeds of crime and, if so, report the 
transaction to the authorities in the form of a suspicious transaction report 
(STR). When these requirements were first established, neither financial 
institutions nor their supervisors/regulators had much experience as to 
what in a client’s profile and the client’s patterns of transactions might  
indicate money laundering. However, based on an expanding knowledge of 
how criminals tend to launder their money, over time financial institutions 
have developed increasingly effective detection and reporting systems. By 
studying known examples of laundering, the FATF, FATF-Style Regional 
Bodies, and national competent authorities (especially financial intelligence 
units) have identified patterns or indicators of possible money laundering, 
and made them available to financial institutions as money laundering   
typologies. In addition, there has been some feedback from financial      
intelligence units and other competent authorities to financial institutions 
with respect to their anti-money laundering programs. Using these sources, 
financial institutions have been able to develop systems to help them      
  
  Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Adjunct Associate 
Professor of International Studies, Brown University. B.A. Yale (1978). J.D. Harvard Law 
School (1984). This preliminary report is to be used in the completion of a consolidated 
report by Professor Nikos Passas of Northeastern University, the Honorable Susan Eckert of 
Brown University, and Professor Gordon. The consolidated report will include cases from 
jurisdictions other than the U.S. as well as additional analytical discussion and bibliograph-
ical material to be provided by Professor Passas and Ms. Eckert. Professor Passas and Ms. 
Eckert were equal participants in the scope and planning of the preliminary report on the 
U.S. and provided significant guidance and editorial assistance in its drafting. Student assis-
tants included Mark Skerry, Jonathan Calka, Daniel Straka, Pratibha Gupta, Jiajia Xu, Al 
Patel, Dan Tsai, Sam Mimoto, and Sean Stevens. Special thanks are given to Jeffrey Brein-
hold of the U.S. Justice Department for compiling the list of terrorism-related prosecutions 
used in the preliminary report and to the numerous Assistant U.S. Attorneys who provided 
materials relevant to the cases examined. Craig Boise, Willie Maddox, and Emile van de 
Does de Willebois provided helpful commentary. This study was financed in part by the 
Financial Market Integrity Group of the World Bank. 
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determine which transactions carry a materially greater risk that          
laundering is involved. 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF 
adopted the VIII Special Recommendations on terrorist financing. Among 
these new requirements were that financial institutions also report to     
authorities if they suspected that a transaction involved the financing of 
terrorism. However, there was little in the way of known patterns of       
terrorism financing that financial institutions could use to help identify such 
transactions. While since that time a number of limited typology studies 
have been made available by the FATF, no comprehensive study of        
terrorism financing typologies has yet been published. For this reason, the 
Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force requested a comprehensive 
study on past terrorism financing techniques that would add to value to 
efforts by both financial institutions and governmental authorities in     
identifying terrorism financing transactions or patterns, also known as  
typologies. 
This preliminary report on prosecutions in the U.S examined 266 
instances of prosecutions that involve charges of terrorism, material      
support of terrorism, or other terrorism-related matters. Of that number, 
thirty were determined to involve financial institutions. Using only publicly 
available information, the study found twenty-four where there was        
sufficient information on financial transactions to see if there were any  
discernible patterns or typologies for terrorism financing. The study       
revealed that sixteen of those indicated known typologies of money       
laundering, although an additional three appear to involve diversion of 
charitable donations. In only one was there a typology that suggested    
possible terrorism financing and not laundering. Of the sixteen cases     
involving suspicious transactions only three appeared to involve criminal 
proceeds. From these cases, it appears that terrorists often use money  
laundering techniques to disguise the origins of funds or to prevent       
competent authorities from tracing payments from end-users to originators, 
even when the origin is not criminal proceeds. However, because it was not 
possible to review any STRs (referred to in the U.S. as Suspicious Activity 
Reports or SARs) that may have been filed by financial institutions with 
respect to these transactions, it was not possible to determine if financial 
institutions, in conducting their review of those transactions, had            
determined that they were suspicious with respect to money laundering or 
terrorism financing. It was also impossible to know if FinCEN had referred 
such SARs to law enforcement for further investigation, or if they had added 
actionable intelligence to the SARs that would suggest either money     
laundering or terrorism financing. Such reviews would be most helpful in 
completing the study. 
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I. THE GLOBAL STANDARD AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
TERRORISM FINANCING1 
A. Overview 
Over the past forty years, anti-money laundering rules have been 
expanded and refined.2 The vast majority of the world’s jurisdictions now 
  
 1 Some of the introductory material for this Report is adopted from Richard K. Gordon, 
Trysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 699 (2008) [hereinafter Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists?] and Richard K. Gordon, Los-
ing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laun-
dering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 503 (2011). 
 2 The first anti-money laundering law enacted in the U.S. was The Currency and Foreign 
Transactions Reporting Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended 
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951–59 (2000), 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314(e), 5316–5530, 5332(2) 
(2000), and 18 U.S.C. §§1956-1957, 1960 (2009)) [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act]. Anti-
money laundering laws were expanded in 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2001, and 2004. 
History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, FINCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/aml_ 
history.html (last visited May 20, 2012) (FinCEN is the U.S. financial intelligence unit); see 
also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Criminal Law: The Tenuous Relationship Between the 
Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
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endorse the latest version of the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF)  
Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering (FATF 40                      
Recommendations)3 and accompanying Methodology for Assessment.4 
  
CRIMINOLOGY 311, 338–69 (2003) (exploring the federal laws and regulations available to 
prosecute money laundering). The EU’s efforts began in 1991 with its first anti-money laun-
dering Directive. Council Directive 91/308/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 (EC). They were 
expanded significantly with the second and third anti-money laundering Directives in 2001 
and 2004. Council Directive 2001/97/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76 (EC); Council Directive 
2005/60/EEC, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15 (EC); see also Alan E. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation: 
Financial Institutions Face Challenges Complying with Anti-Money Laundering Laws, 18 
TRANSNAT’L L. 395, 408–10, 414 (2005) (discussing the development of anti-money launder-
ing law in the EU). The first multilateral convention including anti-money laundering provi-
sions came into force in 1988. U.N. Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion]. This was followed by conventions expanding anti-money laundering provisions. See, 
e.g., The Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, E.T.S. No. 141 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993) 
[hereinafter Strasbourg Convention]; U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, Sept. 29, 2003, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. The Financial Action Task Force published its 
first set of 40 Recommendations on money laundering in 1990. These original Recommenda-
tions were revised and expanded in 1996. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], FORTY 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MONEY LAUNDERING 2 (June 28, 1996); see also FATF, FORTY 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2003) [hereinafter FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS]. Following the attacks 
of September 11, 2001, the FATF added 8 Special Recommendations against Terrorism 
Finance; a 9th Recommendation was added in 2004. History of the FATF, FATF, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ (last visited May 21, 2012). Since 
the FATF’s first set of 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering, the definition of finan-
cial institution has been extended, (and certain requirements have been extended to include 
some persons who are not financial institutions). In addition, rules on record-keeping have 
been tightened, but the general framework of client identification, recordkeeping, client 
monitoring, and reporting of suspicious activities has not changed. Compare  FATF 40 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 16 (defining financial institution as any person or entity en-
gaged in specific transactions, such as accepting deposits, lending, transfers, and others), 
with id. at 7 (obligating other institutions, such as casinos, real estate agents, dealers in pre-
cious metals, lawyers, and trust and company service providers, to adhere to the same stand-
ards).  
 3 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that 130 countries have en-
dorsed the 40 Recommendations). In 2002, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) endorsed 
the FATF 40 Recommendations (and the FATF VIII Special Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing (2001)), which were amended in 2004 to include Special Recommendation IX. 
IMF Advances Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance, IMF (Pub. Info. 
Notice No. 02/87, Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter IMF Pub. Notice], available at http://www.imf. 
org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0287.htm; see also IMF, REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE 
FATF PLENARY MEETING AND PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR 
ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) STANDARD (2002) [hereinafter FATF PLENARY 
MEETING], available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/110 802.pdf (pro-
posing endorsement of the FATF Recommendations to the IMF Executive Board). Because 
nearly every country in the world is a member of the IMF, this endorsement has significant 
resonance. IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, IMF, 
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Starting in 1990, these global standards have required financial institutions5 
to monitor the transactions of their customers, to examine unusual        
transactions to determine if they might involve the proceeds of crime6 and 
since 2001—the financing of terrorism,7 and to report any suspicious   
transactions to special government authorities known as financial           
intelligence units (FIUs). The FIUs then analyze the reports (known as   
suspicious transaction reports (STRs)), along with other relevant data, and 
make recommendations to law enforcement as to which clients or         
transactions should be investigated.8 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in governments 
greatly intensifying their anti-money laundering activities and prompted an 
intensified global effort against terrorism financing.9 In 2002, the           
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank adopted the FATF 40 
Recommendations and the eight new Special Recommendations on        
Terrorism Financing (Special Recommendations) as a world standard.10 
They, along with the FATF and various regional anti-money laundering 
groups known as FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), also began a joint 
global compliance program by assessing the extent to which individual 
  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm (last visited May 21, 2012). More 
importantly, each member of the FATF and each of the eight FATF associate members and 
FATF-style regional bodies has endorsed the FATF 40 Recommendations and Special Rec-
ommendations on Terrorist Financing the as the global standard for anti- money laundering 
and combating the financing of terrorism. See Financial Action Task Force, Members and 
Observers, IMF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ (last visited 
May 21, 2012) (listing all members of FATF); see also PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, REFERENCE 
GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, at III-
7–III-13 (2d ed. 2006), available at http://zunia.org/uploads/media/knowledge/Reference 
_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement1.pdf (summarizing FATF’s mission and FATF member 
obligations). 
 4 See FATF, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF 40 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND FATF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 73 (2009) [hereinafter 
METHODOLOGY] (listing the endorsing bodies, including the IMF, World Bank, and a number 
of regional financial interest groups).  
 5 See generally FATF PLENARY MEETING, supra note 3 (detailing the development of the 
standards over time).  
 6 See FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7–8 (Recommendations 11–15 di-
recting financial institutions to be aware of certain types of suspicious transactions).  
 7 See generally FATF, SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING (2001) 
[hereinafter SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS] (proposing recommendations focused on terrorism 
for addition to the original recommendations). 
 8 SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-3–5. 
 9 Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance 
and Offshore Centers, 88 N.C.L. REV. 501, 564 (2010).  
 10 IMF Pub. Notice, supra note 3. 
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countries were implementing those standards.11 Failure to implement the 
standards adequately can result in a broad application of sanctions or    
countermeasures, including bans on doing business with financial           
institutions located within the borders of non-complying jurisdictions.12 As 
a result, millions of STRs have been forwarded to FIUs by financial       
institutions throughout the world, although how many have resulted in   
further investigation, prosecution, and conviction is not publically        
available.13  
The FATF’s 40 Recommendations and the Special                     
Recommendations are designed to “provide an enhanced, comprehensive 
and consistent framework of measures for combating money laundering and 
terrorist financing.”14 Together they cover, among other things, the       
criminalization of money laundering and terrorism financing, the freezing 
and seizing of criminal proceeds and terrorism funds, key preventive 
measures against laundering and terrorism financing for financial           
institutions and other institutions subject to preventive measures, FIUs, and 
  
 11 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 2–3 (stating that a uniform system of assessment, in-
cluding a single assessment methodology, was agreed to by the IMF, the World Bank and the 
FATF in 2002). IMF assessment reports can be found at Detailed Assessment Reports, IMF, 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=175 (last updated May 24, 2012). World Bank 
assessments can be found at Financial Market Integrity – Assessments, WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/Y902MD2ZL0 (last visited May 24, 2012). These bodies and each 
of the eight FATF associate members and FATF-style regional bodies (many of which are 
undertaken with the participation of the IMF and World Bank) use the uniform assessment 
system. FATF assessments can be found at Mutual Evaluations, FATF, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/ (last visited May 24, 2012) and those of regional bodies 
can be found at Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
– Assessments, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml2.htm#reports (last 
visited May 24, 2012). 
 12 See FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9 (in particular, Recommendation 21 
stating: “[f]inancial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and 
transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries 
which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendation . . . Where such a country 
continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations, countries 
should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures.”). For example, under Title III, Sec. 
311(a) of the USA Patriot Act, if a financial institution is operating with a jurisdiction out-
side of the U.S. and there is concern about that jurisdiction’s money laundering efforts, the 
Secretary of the Treasury “may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or main-
taining in the U.S. of a correspondent account or payable- through account by any domestic 
financial institution or domestic financial agency for or on behalf of a foreign banking insti-
tution.” USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 301 (codified as amended at 31 
U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(5) (2004)). 
 13 E-mail from Boudewijn Verhelst, President, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units, to author (Feb. 27, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Verhelst e-mail]. 
 14 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2 at 2. 
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international cooperation.15 The 40 Recommendations have included similar 
preventive measure requirements since the original 1990 draft.16 In effect, 
these Recommendations divide the responsibility for preventing and       
uncovering money laundering between the private and public sector. 
  
 15 The FATF 40 Recommendations are broken down into 4 groups. First is Group A, titled 
“Legal Systems,” which includes the “scope of the criminal offence of money laundering” 
and “provisional measures and confiscation.” Id. at 3–4. Second is Group B, titled “Measures 
to be Taken by Financial Institutions and [certain] Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
to Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,” which includes prohibition on shell 
banks, customer due diligence and record-keeping (including client identification and trans-
action monitoring), reporting of suspicious transactions and compliance (including internal 
training and audit programs), other measures to deter money laundering and terrorist financ-
ing (including sanctions for failure to comply with the Recommendations), measures to be 
taken with respect to countries that do not or insufficiently comply with the FATF Recom-
mendations, and regulation and supervision. Id. at 4–10. Third is Group C, titled “Institution-
al and Other Measures Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terror-
ism Financing,” which includes competent authorities and their powers and resources (in-
cluding the establishment of a financial intelligence unit) and transparency of legal persons 
and arrangements. Id. at 10–12. Fourth is Group D, titled “International Co-operation,” 
which includes international commitment to implement various treaties, mutual legal assis-
tance and extradition, and other forms of co-operation. Id. at 12–14. The IX Special Recom-
mendations include: (1) ratification and implementation of UN instruments; (2) criminalizing 
the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering; (3) freezing and confiscating 
terrorist assets; (4) reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism (also required in 
Recommendation 13); (5) international co-operation, (6) alternative remittance systems; (7) 
wire transfers; (8) non-profit organizations; and (9) cash couriers. See generally FATF, IX 
SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (2010) [hereinafter IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
 16 Since 1990, there has been a progressive expansion of those persons who must follow 
the “preventive measures” provisions in the FATF 40 Recommendations. See FATF, FORTY 
RECOMMENDATIONS (1990), available at http://www.accessbankplc.com/Library/Documents/ 
Download%20Centre/FATF.pdf; see also FATF, 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 1295 (1996), avail-
able at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/fatf_40_recommendations.pdf. The cur-
rent definition of financial institutions includes any person who engages in acceptance of 
deposits and other repayable funds from the public; lending; financial leasing; the transfer of 
money or value; issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, checks, 
traveler’s checks, money orders and bankers’ drafts, electronic money); financial guarantees 
and commitments; trading in: money market instruments (checks, bills, CDs, derivatives 
etc.), foreign exchange, exchange, interest rate and index instruments, transferable securities, 
commodity futures trading; participation in securities issues and the provision of financial 
services related to such issues; individual and collective portfolio management; safekeeping 
and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons; otherwise invest-
ing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons; underwriting and 
placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance; and money and currency 
changing. METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 65–66. Since 2003, most of the preventive 
measures prescribed for financial institutions have been extended to certain designated non-
financial businesses and persons including: casinos (which also includes internet casinos); 
real estate agents; dealers in precious metals; dealers in precious stones; lawyers; notaries; 
other independent legal professionals and accountants; and trust and company service pro-
viders. Id. at 64.  
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B. Financial Sector Role 
1. Overview 
FATF Recommendations 5 through 13, plus 21 and 22 (and the   
relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of 
compliance) set out the part of the preventive measures system that applies 
financial institutions. Unfortunately these Recommendations are not a  
model of clarity and are not easy for non-experts to comprehend.17       
However, they are designed to create a five-part requirement:18 financial 
institutions must (1) establish and maintain customer identity (including 
beneficial owner and controller of the legal title holder of the account); (2) 
create and maintain an up-to-date customer profile;19 (3) monitor          
transactions to see if they fit with the customer profile of transactions that 
are legitimate; (4) if not, examine further any such transaction to see if it 
might represent the proceeds of crime or financing of terrorism, including 
by examining the source of funds; and (5) if so, report the transaction to the 
FIU, along with a description of why the financial institution believes that 
the transaction is suspicious. Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 34 
(and the relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for           
assessment of compliance) address both the supervisory system to ensure 
that the financial institution comply with their preventive measures        
requirements and the criminal investigation and prosecution system. 
  
 17 See Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of the 
Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determi-
nants in International Law, 31 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 137, 159–60 (2011) (describing the 
sometimes contradictory and confusing language in the Recommendations). In 2002 an at-
tempt was made by the IMF to reorganize the preventive measures Recommendations into a 
more accessible, coherent whole. However, in a series of meetings in 2002 delegations to the 
FATF rejected the effort.  
 18 A working group consisting of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the U.N. Office on 
Drugs ands Crime, the World Bank, and the IMF has drafted a model regulation for the pre-
vention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism as part of a model law on anti-
money laundering and terrorism financing. The Model Regulation implements these FATF 
Recommendations based on the regulatory frameworks in the U.K., Canada, Australia, and 
Hong Kong. Article 5.1(a)–(e) of the Model Regulation outlines CDD as the “(a) identifica-
tion of customers, including beneficial owners; (b) gathering of information on customers to 
create a customer profile; (c) application of acceptance policies to new customers; (d) 
maintenance of customer information on an ongoing basis; [and the] (e) monitoring of cus-
tomer transactions.” Model Regulation (2006) (on file with the U.N. Office on Drugs and 
Crime). Article 10 describes a customer profile as being “of sufficient nature and detail . . . to 
monitor the customer’s transactions, apply enhanced customer due diligence where neces-
sary, and detect suspicious transactions.” Id. 
 19 If a new customer profile suggests that the customer is opening an account with pro-
ceeds of crime, the financial institution should go directly to Step 4. Id.  
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The financial institution’s role focuses on three basic objectives. 
The first is to help exclude from the financial system possible criminal and 
terrorist elements. The FATF 40 and Special IX do this by making financial 
institutions identify and profile potential—and, periodically, existing—
customers to screen out possible criminals and terrorists.20 The second is to 
make available to law enforcement financial information that can be used in 
criminal investigations or as evidence in a prosecution. The FATF 40 + 
Special IX do this by requiring the private sector to maintain records of the 
identity of all clients and their transactions.21 The third is to identify       
customers who might be criminals or terrorists so that law enforcement can 
decide whether to investigate and prosecute such persons. The FATF 40 + 
Special IX do this by requiring the private sector to monitor customer  
transactions based on their profiles and report to law enforcement those that 
raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism financing are involved.   
The U.S. largely complies with these requirements through        
statutory and regulatory measures (although the US does not extend these 
requirements to all those designated non-financial businesses and persons as 
defined in the Methodology), as well as through guidance issued to financial 
institutions.22 The E.U. also largely complies through both Directives     
  
 20 See infra Part I.B.2, notes 38–48, and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra Part I.B.2, notes 49–51, and accompanying text. 
 22 See generally Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2 (requiring U.S. institutions to assist U.S. 
government agencies in the detection and preventions of money laundering). See M. 
MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31208, INTERNATIONAL MONEY 
LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING ACT OF 2001,TITLE III OF P.L. 
107–56 (2001) (providing an overview of the Patriot Act’s role in counterterrorism via anti-
money laundering efforts); FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
83–226 (2006) (describing the laws and regulations in the U.S. pertaining to money launder-
ing and evaluating the quality of these standards) [hereinafter U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT]; Megan Roberts, Big Brother Isn't Just Watching You, He's Also Wasting Your Tax 
Payer Dollars: An Analysis of the Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act, 
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 573, 586–7 (2004) (describing the relevant sections of the Patriot Act 
and their impact on financial institutions). Regulations on customer identification are found 
in 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2006). 31 U.S.C. § 5314(b) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury 
to require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions. It is implemented at 21 
C.F.R. § 21.110 (2006). There are similar customer identification rules for securities broker-
dealers, mutual funds, and futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in com-
modities. 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 103.122 (2006); see also Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority, Anti-Money Laundering, NOTICE TO MEMBERS NO. 02–21, at 5–7 
(2002) (providing guidance to financial institutions in the implementation of anti-money 
laundering protocol); Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Anti-Money Laundering 
Customer Identification Programs for Brokers/Dealers, NOTICE TO MEMBERS NO. 03-34, at 
347 (2003) (notifying members of the implementation of the Patriot Act as pertains to finan-
cial institutions). Under 31 C.F.R. § 103.137(c) (2006), a life insurer is required to have 
policies and procedures for obtaining “all relevant customer-related information necessary 
for an effective anti-money laundering program.”  
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(essentially instructions to members of the Union) and implementing      
legislation at the member state level.23 The language used to implement the 
Recommendations is often similar to that found in the Recommendations.24 
2. Details 
FATF Recommendation 5 requires that financial institutions     
identify their customers, including the beneficial owner of a customer    
account, which, in the case of legal persons and other legal arrangements 
such as trusts, includes taking “reasonable measures” to identify the      
physical persons who own or control the legal person.25 Recommendation 
12 extends these requirements to certain designated non-financial          
businesses and persons (known as DNFBPs; for purposes of this Report the 
term “financial institution” should be read to include DNFBPs), which   
include casinos (which often deal with cash that can be exchanged for chips 
and vice versa, providing laundering opportunities), real estate agents (in 
part because real estate is often of high value, it is often used as an         
investment vehicle by launderers), dealers in precious metals (included for 
similar reasons, plus the fact that the ownership of precious metals can be 
easily transferred), lawyers, notaries, and persons who assist in the setting 
up of trusts and companies (these are often professionals who assist      
launderers in hiding assets).26 Although neither the Recommendation itself 
nor the Methodology uses the term “client profile,” Recommendation 5  
requires that the financial institutions determine the purpose and intended 
nature of the business relationship of a potential—and periodically, of a 
  
 23 Sorcher, supra note 2 at 408–10 (discussing the various Directives already applied and 
the structure of the proposed “Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive”). 
 24 Compare FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5 (Recommendation 5 describ-
ing the measures to be taken in performing customer due diligence), with Money Laundering 
Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2157, art. 5 (U.K.) (adopting language almost identical to FATF 
Recommendation 5 in describing the measures to be taken for customer due diligence). Fur-
thermore, in the course of their assessment work for the IMF and the World Bank, research-
ers have reviewed implementing statutory and regulatory language in The British Virgin 
Islands, Hong Kong, Niger, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the U.K. and often 
found language nearly identical to that used in the Recommendations and Methodology. This 
may be due to decisions to enact the two verbatim so as to ensure that legislation complies 
with the standard. 
 25 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5–6 (Recommendation 5 requiring cus-
tomer due-diligence and record-keeping). The Methodology allows an exception from this 
latter requirement in the event the legal person is a public company. METHODOLOGY, supra 
note 4, at 17–18. 
 26 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7. Recommendation 22 requires that the 
principles applicable to financial institutions also be applied to branches and majority owned 
subsidiaries located abroad. Id. at 9. 
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current—client and a “knowledge of the customer, their business and risk 
profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.”27 
This serves two purposes. If a financial institution cannot establish a 
potential client’s identity and profile, it must terminate the business        
relationship.28 Second, the financial institution can measure future        
transactions of accepted clients against this baseline of normal or typical 
transactions. Specifically, financial institutions must “obtain information on 
the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship . . . [and]    
conduct ongoing customer due diligence on the business relationship,” and 
undertake a “scrutiny of transactions under taken throughout the course of 
th[e] relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are       
consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, its business and 
risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.”29 If the     
financial institution cannot comply, the financial institution should         
terminate business relations or not undertake a transaction.30 Second, the 
client profile allows the financial institutions to monitor client transactions 
to see if they are unusual compared with the profile.  
A key development in the 2003 Recommendations was the adoption 
of an optional risk-based approach for certain preventive measures.        
According to the Financial Action Task Force, the adoption of risk         
sensitivity “involve[s] identifying and categorizing money laundering risks 
and establishing reasonable controls based on risks identified . . . .”31 This 
risk-based program, which apparently does not apply to terrorism financing, 
contrasts with the previous program, in which each of the FATF            
Recommendations was to be implemented objectively regardless of relative 
risk levels.32 FATF Recommendation 5 now allows financial institutions to 
  
 27 Id. at 5. 
 28 Id. at 9. Recommendation 18 also forbids financial institutions to transact business with 
shell banks and “guard against” establishing relations with those that do. Id. 
 29 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 17.  
 30 Id. at 19. It should also consider filing a suspicious transaction report to the Financial 
Intelligence Unit, but is not required to do so. FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 
8.  
 31 FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 2 (2007) [hereinafter 
GUIDANCE ON RBA]. The U.S. has adopted a risk-based system. See FED. FIN. INST. 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION 
MANUAL 11–27, I-1, K-1, M-1, M-1–2 (2006) [hereinafter FFIEC MANUAL] (describing 
implementation of the Bank Secrecy Act with a risk-based approach). 
 32 GUIDANCE ON RBA, supra note 31, at 2. According to the FATF, the new focus on risk 
allows financial institutions and supervisory authorities to be more efficient and effective in 
their use of resources and minimize burdens on customers, although it does not say exactly 
how. Id. During the years when the FATF was considering the adoption of a risk based-
approach disagreement tended to arise at between those FATF delegates from a law en-
forcement background and those from a regulatory, particularly bank regulatory background, 
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determine the extent of such measures on a risk-sensitive basis, depending 
on the type of customer, business relationship, or transaction.33 Other    
Recommendations address new technologies and reliance on third parties 
for due diligence.34 
Recommendation 10 requires that financial institutions maintain 
customer records, including identification and transaction records sufficient 
to permit reconstruction of individual transactions for evidence in a       
prosecution, and that these records be maintained for at least five years and 
be available for inspection by competent authorities.35 Special                
Recommendation VII provides more detail with respect to wire transfers.36 
  
with the latter arguing in favor of a risk-based approach. In general, the banking regulators 
were used to dealing with concepts of risk while law enforcement was not. “Supervisors 
must be satisfied that banks and banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk man-
agement process (including Board and senior management oversight) to identify, evaluate, 
monitor and control or mitigate all material risks.” BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf.  
 33 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 19. The Methodology goes on to provide 
certain examples of higher risk categories. METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 17. Recommen-
dation 6 singles out a particular category of customers, those individuals who are or have 
been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, as well as family mem-
bers or close associates, which are termed politically-exposed persons. FATF 40 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 22. It requires financial institutions and DNFBP to have 
risk management systems to determine if customers are politically-exposed persons and to 
take reasonable measures to establish the “source of wealth and source of funds” and to 
“conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.” In other words, if a 
customer is a politically exposed person the financial institution and certain others must 
always take measures to establish the source of funds. Recommendation 6 was added in 2003 
to address a perceived public backlash against developed country banks that had laundered 
the proceeds of developed country dictators. Id. at 5–6. 
 34 Under FATF Recommendation 8, “[f]inancial institutions should pay special attention 
to any money laundering threats that may arise from new or developing technologies,” and 
recommends that they have “policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks 
associated with non-face to face business relationships or transactions.” Id. at 6. FATF Rec-
ommendation 9 permits financial institutions to rely on third parties to undertake some due 
diligence measures in certain cases. Id. 
 35 Id. at 7. FATF Recommendation 10 also suggests that financial institutions keep and 
maintain client account records, and that they “must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of 
individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to 
provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.” Id. Competent authori-
ties are defined as “all administrative and law enforcement authorities concerned with com-
bating money laundering and terrorist financing, including the FIU and supervisors.” 
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 62. An FIU is a financial intelligence unit. Id. at 66. 
 36 See IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 15, at 3 (recommending that countries 
take actions to enhance their security and gain meaningful originator information for wire 
transfers). 
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This, along with Recommendation 5, allows investigative and prosecutorial 
authorities to “follow the money” of criminal suspects.37 
Recommendation 11 requires that “[f]inancial institutions pay    
special attention to complex, unusual large and all unusual patterns of  
transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose.”38 
Financial institutions must examine, “as far as possible,” the background 
and purpose of such transactions, and establish their findings in writing.39 
This requirement is separate from Recommendation 5’s requirement for 
ongoing customer due diligence with respect to “scrutiny of transactions.”40 
Recommendation 13 requires that a financial institution report promptly to 
the governmental FIU if it “suspects” or has “reasonable grounds” to      
suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity.41 The            
Methodology describes this as filing an STR.42 Key to the subject of this 
Report, Special Recommendation IV further requires financial institutions 
to file reports if they suspect terrorism financing.43 
Most jurisdictions provide a template or form for filing STRs (or, in 
the U.S., Suspicious Activity Reports: SARs). The U.S. form requires, in 
addition to financial institutions, client, and transaction identification     
information that a box be checked to characterize the suspicious activity. 
Options include “structuring/money laundering” and “terrorism financing,” 
as well as various boxes relating to fraud, embezzlement, and identity 
  
 37 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4–5 (proposing identification require-
ments that will allow institutions and governments to more easily trace accounts). The U.S. 
has put in place similar rules. FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 45, at 31, 118–22, 261–64 (detail-
ing identification procedures for different types of customers in order to ensure accounts and 
transactions are traceable). 
 38 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7. 
 39 Id. at 5, 7 (Recommendations 5 and 10 listing necessary information to be kept on file 
and how files should be managed). 
 40 Id. at 5; see also METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 25 (“A financial institution should be 
required by law or regulation to report to the FIU (a suspicious transaction report–STR) 
when it suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a crimi-
nal activity.”). 
 41 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 25. 
 42 Id. 
 43 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 2. Recommendation 21 requires that 
financial institutions and DNFBP pay “special attention” to business relationships and trans-
actions with persons from countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommen-
dations (although it does not say how this is to differ from non-special (or average) atten-
tion). FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9. This Recommendation raises the 
costs of doing business with persons from countries that do not sufficiently apply the Rec-
ommendations as a whole. This creates a financial incentive for countries to implement the 
Recommendations, especially as determined by assessment reports. Id. 
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theft.44 Also required is a narrative description of the suspected violation, 
including what is unusual, irregular, and suspicious about the reported 
transaction.45 
It is these Recommendations, along with Recommendation 5, that 
create the system requiring financial institutions to monitor customer   
transactions based on their profiles and to report to law enforcement those 
that raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism financing might be 
involved. Recommendation 15 requires financial institutions to develop 
internal policies, procedures, and controls for anti-money laundering      
programs, including compliance management arrangements, internal train-
ing, and audit capacities.46 Recommendation 16 extends most of these    
requirements to the same designated non-financial businesses and persons 
as found in Recommendation 12, although not all.47 
An essential aspect of this part of the preventive measures system 
should be emphasized. Financial institutions must design and implement 
their own systems.48 While the five-part requirement describes what these 
  
 44 FinCEN, Suspicious Activity Report, Part III (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fin 
cen.gov/forms/files/f9022-47_sar-di.pdf.  
 45 Id. Part V. 
 46 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 8. 
 47 Id. at 8. Recommendation 14 protects financial institutions from any liability for filing 
suspicious activities reports and prohibits the reporting person from revealing that such re-
ports are being made (known as the prohibition against tipping off). U.S. rules comply with 
these requirements, except that DNFBP include casinos only. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.18–19 
(2006) (describing the types of transactions that require reporting, including funds derived 
from illegal activity or transactions that have no business or apparent lawful purpose).  
 48 See, e.g., FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4 (Recommendation 5 stating: 
“[f]inancial institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures . . . but may de-
termine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis. . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 5 
(Recommendation 6 stating that financial systems should “[h]ave appropriate risk manage-
ment systems. . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 6 (Recommendation 8 stating: “financial institu-
tions should have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated 
with non-face to face business relationships or transactions”) (emphasis added); id. at 6 
(Recommendation 9 stating: “[a] financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party 
is regulated and supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with [customer due 
diligence requirements] in line with Recommendations 5 and 10.”) (emphasis added); id. at 7 
(Recommendation 10 stating: “records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individ-
ual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to pro-
vide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.”) (emphasis added); id. 
(“Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transac-
tions . . . . The background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be 
examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities 
and auditors.”) (emphasis added); id. at 8 (Recommendation 13 stating: “[i]f a financial 
institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a 
criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing it should be required to report promptly 
its suspicions. . . .”) (emphasis added); id. (“[f]inancial institutions should develop pro-
gram[]s against money laundering and terrorist financing . . . [including] [t]he development 
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systems are supposed to accomplish, it does not provide any detail as to 
how they are supposed to do it. Financial institutions are not told how to 
implement those requirements. An exception to this is Recommendation 25, 
which requires that government authorities establish guidelines and provide 
feedback to assist financial institutions and others subject to preventive 
measures, “in particular in detecting and reporting suspicious                
transactions.”49 
Neither compliance reports nor sanctions reported by supervisory 
authorities discuss in any detail the design of compliance systems.50       
Financial institutions also do not publicize exactly how they implement 
these requirements.51 Clearly, monitoring of transactions to determine if 
they vary from the expected client profile is the first key. Such monitoring 
appears to be based first, as required by Recommendation 11, on whether a 
transaction (or series of transactions) differs in magnitude from that      
normally expected of the client, based on the client’s profile. Further     
scrutiny of the transaction can determine if something else appears unusual, 
such as an unusual transferor or transferee. 
One aspect of successful transaction analysis is link analysis, a 
technique used to find associations within data that might have relevance to 
the particular research question.52 Link analysis explores associations within 
collections of data.53 Increasing the number of data sets available increases 
the number and types of links that can be identified. There are a number of 
different types of data sets that could be helpful in money laundering or 
terrorism financing link analysis. First, personal and financial data          
(including personal and businesses names, addresses, phone numbers, 
  
of internal policies, procedures and controls, including appropriate compliance management 
arrangements. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 49 Id. at 10.  
 50 See id. (Recommendation 25 stating only that guidelines should be established, not what 
those guidelines should be).  
 51 An important barrier to learning more about how firms actually implement their preven-
tive measures is a desire for protecting proprietary information in the context of competitive 
concerns, something researchers have learned from numerous interviews conducted with 
compliance officers at financial institutions in the U.S., Hong Kong, The British Virgin Is-
lands, and the Philippines over the past five years. See Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and 
Anti-Terrorist Financing (ATF): Case Study, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, http://www.pwc. 
com/lu/en/anti-money-laundering/case.jhtml (last visited May 22, 2012) (providing almost 
no detail on a preventive measures system recommended by an outside consultant). 
 52 Cuéllar, supra note 2, at 368–69. 
 53 FINCEN, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING 
SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT 10 (2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news 
_room/rp/files/CBFTFS_Complete.pdf [hereinafter FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC 
FUNDS]; see also Cuéllar, supra note 2, at 368–69. Much of the information in the following 
two paragraphs of text has been provided by Boudewijn Verhelst. Verhelst e-mail, supra 
note 13. 
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names of beneficial owners and controllers, bank accounts, deposits, funds 
transfers) would link people and businesses through their financial       
transactions. For example, this can establish that person A has a relationship 
with company B and person C. 
Next, descriptive links can be established with databases that       
describe the type of business activities normally conducted by the persons 
within the link. Such data includes customer identification/profiles and  
other information such as that which is found in business directories like 
Dunn and Bradstreet. Links can also be made to data that include money 
laundering or terrorism financing indicators, such as law enforcement data, 
case files, or STRs, can also be made. 
Once such descriptive links are established, further analysis can 
help determine if a transaction between identified persons looks unusual or 
suspicious. For example, if person A has a terrorism-related record or has 
made past suspicious transactions, payments to company B or C could raise 
suspicion that payments might be related to terrorism financing. This     
suspicion could be raised further if person A owns or controls company B 
and company B itself has no known business, and if B itself is located in a 
jurisdiction where terrorism is known to be active. If C has a record as a 
terrorist or terrorist organization, a stronger suspicion might be raised that 
the payments were made to finance terrorism. Obviously, the greater the 
amount of relevant data and data types, the more extensive will be the link 
analysis. However, financial institutions and DNFBPs are restricted in their 
access to some useful data sets. 
Such use of descriptive links and analysis is also described as data 
mining and the use of red flags.54 Such “red flags” or “indicators” are based 
on laundering or terrorism financing typologies. Such typologies are those 
typically provided by the FATF or local competent authorities (sometimes, 
they result from international financial institutions’ own FIU efforts).  
Without such typologies it is difficult for financial institutions to know if a 
transaction or series of transaction is, in fact, an indicator of laundering or 
terrorism financing. 
Some financial institutions contract out some of their customer 
identification and client monitoring programs to third-party service        
providers. A review of some of their programs provides some insight into 
services offered. For example, some firms assist in customer identification 
and profiling by providing a risk-screening service to check individual or 
entity names against a comprehensive data set.55 Firms can also supply 
  
 54 G. S. Vidyashankar, Rajesh Natarajan & Subhrangshu Sanyal, Mine Your Way to Com-
bat Money Laundering, Part 2, INFO. MGMT. (Oct. 1, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.infor 
mation-management.com/specialreports/20071009/1093416-1.html?zkPrintable=true.  
 55 E.g., WORLD-CHECK ONLINE, http://www.world-check.com/ (last visited May 22, 2012).  
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transaction monitoring services. One firm “monitors and detects” suspicious 
transactions “across all business lines” using “a fully integrated dynamic 
and adaptive multidimensional intelligent engine [which] detects suspicious 
activities.”56 This is accomplished using “risk modeling” and “risk-based 
algorithms” to “analyze and investigate suspicious activities effectively and 
efficiently.”57 Presumably, they use link analysis combined with red-flag 
analysis to help determine which transactions warrant the filing of a report. 
C. Public Sector Role 
Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 32 (and the relevant    
materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of compliance) 
address both the supervisory system—to ensure private sector compliance 
with its preventive measures requirements—and the criminal investigation 
and prosecution system for state law enforcement authorities.58 The public 
sector’s role focuses on three basic objectives. The first objective is to    
ensure the private sector’s compliance with their preventive measure      
responsibilities. Essentially, governmental authorities must supervise and 
regulate financial institutions to ensure compliance. This must include both 
guidance and examination functions, including the potential application of 
sanctions. The second objective is to ensure that STRs lead to the           
investigation of appropriate cases of suspected crime and terrorism.        
Essentially, a FIU receives and analyzes these reports along with other key 
information. It then decides which should be further investigated, and it 
forwards them to the appropriate government agency (typically the police). 
The FIU then decides, sometimes in consultation with state prosecutors, 
whether and how to go forward. 
Recommendation 25 requires that government authorities establish 
guidelines and provide feedback to assist financial institutions “in detecting 
and reporting suspicious transactions.”59 The Methodology goes further by 
  
 56 Press Release, GlobalVision Systems, Inc., American Bankers Association Endorses 
PATRIOT OFFICER® as #1 AML/BSA Solution (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.gv-systems. 
com/2010/06/08/american-bankers-association-endorses-patriot-officer%C2%AE-as-1-amlbs 
a-solution/ [hereinafter ABA Endorses PATRIOT OFFICER®]. See generally PATRIOT 
OFFICER® for Banks, GLOBALVISION SYSTEMS, INC., http://www.gv-systems.com/products-
solutions/patriot-officer-for-banks/ (last visited June 11, 2012) (providing anti-money laun-
dering and anti-terrorist financing monitoring software designed to comply with the USA 
Patriot Act and other anti-laundering regulations). 
 57 ABA Endorses PATRIOT OFFICER®, supra note 56. 
 58 Recommendations 18 and 19 are listed under the preventive measures section of the 
FATF Recommendations; 26 through 32 are under “C. Institutional and Other Measures 
Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Competent 
authorities, Their Powers and Resources.” FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9–
11.  
 59 Id. at 10. 
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stating that authorities should provide a description of money-laundering 
and terrorism-financing techniques and methods and any additional 
measures to ensure that the systems are implemented by financial           
institutions.60 This includes information on current techniques, methods and 
trends (typologies);61 examples of actual money laundering cases; and case-
by-case feedback, including if an STR was found to relate to a legitimate 
transaction. 
In order to ensure compliance with the preventive measures,     
Recommendation 23 requires that financial institutions be subject to       
adequate regulation and supervision to ensure implementation of the      
preventive measures,62 while Recommendations 29 and 17 require that   
supervisors have adequate powers to ensure compliance including the    
imposition of sanctions.63 Recommendation 26 requires that countries    
establish an FIU64 to serve as a national center for the receipt, analysis, and 
  
 60 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 33. 
 61 See Methods and Trends, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/ (last 
visited May 22, 2012). 
The methods used for laundering money and the financing of terrorism are in con-
stant evolution. As the international financial sector implements the FATF stand-
ards, criminals must find alternative channels to launder proceeds of criminal activ-
ities and finance illicit activities. The FATF identifies new threats and researches 
money laundering and terrorist financing methods. FATF Typologies reports de-
scribe and explain their nature, thus increasing global awareness and allowing for 
earlier detection. 
Id. 
 62 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9–10. Recommendation 24 extends this 
requirement to designated non-financial businesses and persons. Id. at 10.  
 63 Id. at 9, 11. U.S. laws also comply with these requirements. See 31 C.F.R. § 103 (2004) 
(addressing “financial recordkeeping and reporting of currency and foreign transactions”); 
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 (1980) (requiring recordkeeping of financial transactions). 
The U.S. has levied significant fines, as well as other supervisory and regulatory orders, 
against financial institutions and casinos. See David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the 
Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1414–15 (2007). 
Since September 11, FinCEN has imposed a staggering number of fines on banks 
for failing to meet its reporting requirements. Moreover, those fines have been ex-
traordinarily large. ABN AMRO, a large European bank, has been hit with a $30 
million fine (and more from state regulators). Western Union has also been hit with 
a $30 million fine for its record-keeping failures. And the Department of Justice 
has brought criminal prosecutions for anti-money-laundering violations, which re-
sulted in a $50 million civil monetary penalty against AmSouth and $43 million in 
combined criminal and civil fines against Riggs Bank, which put the bank out of 
business. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 64 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10–11. The line between what some 
countries formally refer to as their financial intelligence unit and other law enforcement 
agencies is often blurry. This Report refers to the financial intelligence unit using a function-
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dissemination of STRs and other information regarding potential money 
laundering or terrorist financing. It further states that the FIU should have 
timely access, directly or indirectly, to the financial, administrative, and 
law-enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its   
functions, including the analysis of STRs.65 Recommendation 10 states that 
competent authorities (including FIUs) should have access to records kept 
by financial institutions and DNFBPs.66 Finally, Recommendation 40 states 
that countries should ensure that their competent authorities provide the 
widest possible range of international cooperation to their foreign         
counterparts, including information relating to money laundering, provided 
that controls and safeguards are in place to ensure that information         
exchanged is used only in a manner consistent with obligations concerning 
privacy and data protection.67 The Methodology further states that FIUs 
should be authorized to allow foreign intelligence units to search their own 
databases, including law enforcement databases, subject to confidentiality 
safeguards limiting the use of the data.68 This is the only substantive      
Recommendation relating to FIUs.69 
  
al definition. See What is an FIU?, THE EGMONT GROUP FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, 
http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/what-is-an-fiu (last visited May 22, 2012) (describing the 
different types of FIUs); The Egmont Group, The Egmont Definition of a Financial Intelli-
gence Unit 1–2 (interpretive note, last visited May 22, 2012), available at http://www.eg 
montgroup.org/library/download/8 (providing a functional definition of FIU not cabined to 
any particular sort of law enforcement).  
 65 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10–11. For example, FinCEN has access 
to numerous databases. These include several databases of criminal reports sourced from the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s TECS II system, the FBI’s National Criminal 
Information Center, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
Information and NDIC Systems, the U.S. Secret Service database, and the U.S. Postal In-
spection Service. It also has access to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s list of Specially 
Designated Nationals, the Social Security Administration’s Death Master File, and the State 
Department’s list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. It also has access to com-
mercial database services from organizations such as Dun & Bradstreet, LEXIS/NEXIS, and 
credit bureaus as well as commercially available lists of “Politically Exposed Persons.” Fin-
CEN also maintains its own database of investigations and queries conducted through Fin-
CEN’s systems. FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS, supra note 53, at 9–10.  
 66 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7. 
 67 Id. at 13–14. 
 68 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 46.  
 69 See generally FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 13. The draft methodology 
included a significant number of criteria spelling out in detail the duties of financial intelli-
gence units, including most of those described in infra notes and accompanying text. How-
ever, during a meeting in Basel in February, 2002 representatives of the Egmont Group, an 
informal association of financial intelligence units, objected to the spelling out in such detail 
of the purposes and activities of FIUs because of the difficulty of finding consensus on such 
a large amount of detail from such a large group. Nevertheless, the representatives largely 
concurred that the criteria in the methodology described an effective financial intelligence 
unit. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 38 (2002). The U.S. largely complies with these re-
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Dividing the task of determining suspicious and really suspicious 
transactions between the private sector and public FIUs usually begins with 
the receipt of an STR, after which the FIU engages in a two-part analysis. In 
the first part, known as “tactical analysis,” the FIU looks for additional  
information on the persons and transactions involved or other elements  
involved in a particular case to provide the basis for further analysis.70 A 
key element of such tactical analysis is link analysis, which has been      
discussed at length above in the context of transaction monitoring and    
suspicious transaction reporting. Financial intelligence units typically have 
available various types of data, including those publicly available databases 
to which the private sector has access. An FIU can also have access to   
nonpublic databases such as tax records, police records, immigration and 
customs records, vehicle registries, and supervisory findings, as well as  
investigation reports for ongoing investigations, criminal records (which are 
nonpublic in many countries), currency transaction reports, currency and 
monetary instrument reports, and related-party data (same address or      
telephone number, known associates, etc.).71 
Following tactical link analysis, the FIU typically undertakes      
operational analysis. Operational analysis uses tactical information to    
formulate different hypotheses on the possible activities of the suspect to 
produce operational intelligence for use by investigators. It uses: 
[A]ll sources of information available to the FIU to produce activity      
patterns, new targets, relationships among the subject and his or her       
accomplices, investigative leads, criminal profiles, and—where possible—
indications of possible future behavior. One of the techniques of            
operational analysis used in some FIUs is financial profiling.
72
 
Based on such analysis, the FIU may or may not disseminate a report for 
further investigation.73 In recommending an SAR for further investigation, 
FIUs may include a description of what they had learned from these       
different types of analysis. This is often called “actionable intelligence” that 
can assist law enforcement in conducting a further investigation. 
Another important function of the FIU is strategic analysis, or the 
development of relevant knowledge on laundering or terrorism-financing 
techniques. Examples include the identification of evolving criminal      
patterns in a particular group or the provision of broad insights into    
  
quirements. See U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 226-40 (describing the 
U.S. laws that fulfill FIU obligations). 
 70 See SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-5–6 (describing the analytical role of FIUs); see also 
IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS: AN OVERVIEW 57–58 (2004) [hereinafter IMF, FIUS].  
 71 Verhelst e-mail, supra note 13.  
 72 IMF, FIUS, supra note 70, at 60.  
 73 Id. at 61. 
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emerging patterns of criminality, including transactions particular to a given 
group, ideology or geographic location.74 The FIU can then use these for its 
own operational analysis of STRs through linking as well as to develop 
guidelines, typologies etc. for use by financial institutions.75 This generally 
follows the system used by FinCEN in the U.S.76 
II. DETECTION OF TERRORISM FINANCING 
A. Overview 
As discussed above, the FATF adopted the Special                    
Recommendations in November, 2001, after the previous month’s terrorist 
attacks against the U.S. However, that the financing of terrorism should be 
so closely tied to anti-money laundering was by no means completely    
obvious. While terrorism had existed before 9/11, the original FATF 40 
made no reference to it. Anti-money laundering laws were designed to stop 
criminals from taking criminal proceeds and running them through the  
financial system in a series of transactions to hide their criminal origins 
and/or actual ownership. On the other hand, terrorism financing need not 
involve criminal origins but only a particular type of criminal destination: 
terrorism. 
Of course, there were some obvious connections. As discussed 
above, identifying the financial institution’s clients was a key aspect of anti-
money laundering preventive measures. These measures could also be used 
to identify whether the client was a terrorist, provided of course that the 
financial institution or the authorities knew who the terrorists were. This 
proved to be a valuable avenue for combating terrorism-financing measures. 
Before the 9/11 attacks, the U.N. Security Council had passed resolutions 
requiring all states to freeze accounts held by members of al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban and had set up the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee.77 
The Committee created a consolidated list of entities and officials           
associated with these organizations, as submitted by members. Subsequent 
  
 74 See SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-3 (discussing definitions of FIUs that emphasis speci-
ficity to each nation’s needs and characteristics); see also IMF, FIUS, supra note 70, at 59–60 
(noting that unusual transactions develop the basis for further investigation by the financial 
intelligence units). 
 75 IMF, FIUS, supra note 70, at 60. 
 76 See generally U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 126–36 (discussing 
record keeping rules for the banking, securities, insurance, and money services business 
sectors to combat money laundering and requirements to report unusual, suspicious transac-
tions). 
 77 S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
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resolutions strengthened this original commitment.78 Resolution 1373—
passed as a result of the 9/11 attacks—extended the requirement of states to 
freeze accounts to terrorists other than al-Qaeda and the Taliban.79 The  
General Assembly had also adopted a Convention on Suppression of      
Terrorism Financing, although it did not go into force until April, 2002.80 
The convention requires contracting states to take appropriate measures “for 
the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or 
allocated for the purpose of committing [terrorist offenses as defined in the 
convention] as well as the proceeds derived from such offences, for        
purposes of possible forfeiture.”81 
Assuming that someone could come up with a list of possible      
terrorists, financial institutions could compare that list to their account  
holders to see if there was a match, much as they could now do with known 
criminals. However, as discussed above, the new anti-terrorism financing 
regime required financial institutions to profile clients and monitor       
transactions to see if they might have some involvement in the financing of 
terrorism, and to report those cases as well. When the FATF first published 
its 40 Recommendations, financial institutions in most FATF member  
countries were in the process of implementing a client identification-,    
  
 78 Id. ¶ 6; see also Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 
1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, U.N. SECURITY 
COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ (last visited May 22, 2012) (explaining 
subsequent resolutions modified and strengthened policies by designating sanction measures 
to specific individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaeda). 
 79 S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).  
 80 See generally International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Suppression of Financing Convention] 
(prohibiting the financing of terrorism). 
 81 Id. art 8. The Treaty defined terrorism as acts described in any treaty in the Annex, and:  
Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to 
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act.  
Id. art. 2(1)(b). The treaties listed in the Annex include unlawful seizure of aircraft, unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation, crimes against internationally protected persons (in-
cluding diplomatic agents), the taking of hostages, the unlawful acquisition or threat to nu-
clear material, unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation and 
against the safety of civil aviation, unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, 
unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf, and ter-
rorist bombings. Id. Annex; see also G.A. Res. 164, Annex, U.N. Doc A/52/164 (Jan. 9, 
1998) (attaching the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings for 
adoption by the General Assembly). With certain limited exceptions in each convention, the 
terrorists must be nationals of a different state than the state in which the terrorist act took 
place. See Suppression of Financing Convention, supra note 80, art. 3; see also G.A. Res. 
164, supra note 81, annex, art. 2.  
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profiling-, monitoring-, and STR-reporting system for criminal proceeds 
reflecting the system required by the FATF 40. But when the system was 
extended to terrorism financing, neither financial institutions nor their    
supervisors had much, if any, relevant experience. While they had not   
originally been in the business of finding criminal proceeds, at least       
financial institutions had years of learning how to do so, as well as         
considerable typology guidance from competent authorities, the FATF, and 
FSRBs. 
B.  Terrorism Typologies/Indicators/Red Flags 
As discussed above, financial institutions implement their STR-
reporting requirements by, among other things, identifying clients          
(including determining exactly who they really are), creating client profiles, 
monitoring client transactions with respect to those profiles to identify large 
or unusual transactions, performing link analysis, and comparing          
transactions to known typologies of money laundering and terrorism to see 
if any red flags are raised. 
Such typologies are provided by domestic competent authorities, as 
well as by the FATF or FSRBs. But what are those terrorism typologies, 
indicators and red flags? 
Soon after the FATF adopted the Special Recommendations, the 
FATF Secretariat published Guidance for Financial Institutions in         
Detecting Terrorist Financing, stating that that “[i]t should be         
acknowledged…that financial institutions will probably be unable to detect 
terrorist financing as such.”82 While there was mention of charities as being 
of special concern, there was no attempt to tie these to any special type of 
charity, or to charities sending payments to locations known to have       
terrorism concerns. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
U.S.’s Staff Report on Terrorist Financing, published two years after the 
adoption of the Special IV, concluded that: 
[Financial institutions] can be most useful in the fight against terrorist     
financing by collecting accurate information about their customers and 
providing this information . . . to aid in terrorism investigations. . . .   
However, the requirement that financial institutions file SARs does not 
work very well to detect or prevent terrorist financing, for there is a     
fundamental distinction between money laundering and terrorist financing. 
  
 82 FATF, GUIDANCE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN DETECTING TERRORIST FINANCING 3 
(2002). 
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Financial institutions have the information and expertise to detect the one 
but not the other.
83
 
In its sixth report, the U.N. Security Council’s Monitoring Team 
was not enthusiastic about the effectiveness of preventive measures in    
deterring terrorism financing, in part because of lack of guidance. “The  
volume of suspicious transaction reports has increased tremendously, 
though the procedure suffers from a lack of guidance as to what to look for. 
. . . Only a small proportion of the reports are related to terrorist financing 
and hardly any have been associated with Al-Qaida.”84 
Early in 2008, the FATF released its most comprehensive report to 
date on terrorist financing.85 The Report stated that “[d]espite the challenge 
in developing generic indicators of terrorist financing activity financial  
institutions may nevertheless identify unusual characteristics about a    
transaction that should prompt the filing of a suspicious transaction        
report.”86 However, the cases and examples dealt almost entirely with    
individuals or organizations identified as having terrorism connections   
rather than through terrorism financing indicators (including “media      
coverage of account holder’s activities,”87 presumably when the media   
reveals that someone may be connected to terrorism in some way). The only 
uniquely terrorism financing indicators noted in the Report were charity and 
relief organizations sending to or receiving funds from “locations of specific 
concern.” 
While there has so far been relatively little guidance to financial   
institutions as to indicators or typologies of greater risk of terrorism       
financing, they are still required to implement Special IV, VI, and VII.   
Anecdotal evidence gathered largely from informal interviews with      
compliance officers at financial institutions in the U.S. has indicated that at 
least some financial institutions have implemented “defensive” systems 
based largely on whether a client or potential client is a charity that makes 
payments to charities based in terrorism “hot spots;” this includes not     
accepting the charity as a client or filing STRs after a charity makes any 
  
 83 JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG, & SERENA WILLE, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING, 
STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 52–54 (2004). 
 84 Sixth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanction Monitoring Team, transmitted by 
letter dated Mar. 8, 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. established 
pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005) concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
and associated individuals and entities, at 24, U.N. Doc. S/2007/132 (Mar. 8, 2007).  
 85 See generally FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING (2008) (exploring issues of terrorist re-
quirements for fund, how terrorists raise and move fund, and the international response to 
terrorist financing). 
 86 Id. at 29. 
 87 Id. at 31. 
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large transaction. If true, this would not only raise costs to financial        
institutions, but would also reduce financial services to needy clients. It 
would also suggest that financial institutions’ STRs included at least a high 
number of false positives (and perhaps a high number of false negatives), 
which would raise costs to FIUs and law enforcement without improving 
capacity to deter or prevent terrorism financing. 
III. STUDY TO IDENTIFY TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS 
A. Overview 
This preliminary study on terrorism-related prosecutions in the U.S. 
was completed by Professor Richard Gordon of the Case Western Reserve 
University, with assistance from students at Case Western. It is to be used in 
the completion of a final report by Professor Nikos Passas of Northeastern 
University and the Honorable Susan Eckert of Brown University, which will 
include cases from other jurisdictions, additional analytical discussion, and 
bibliographical material.  
The objective of the U.S. study is to identify red flags or indicators 
of terrorism that financial institutions can use in implementing their duties 
to monitor client transactions and report those that raise a suspicion of   
terrorism financing. The study research methodology included five steps: 
(1) We selected terrorism cases that were successfully prosecuted. 
(2) We examined those cases to determine which involved a   
transaction though a regulated financial institution, and we   
collected the relevant client identification, profiling, and    
transaction data. 
(3) We examined the data to identify any possible indicators of   
terrorism financing. 
(4) We determined if any SARs were filed by financial institutions 
with respect to those transactions. We reviewed the SARs to see 
why they were filed, including by examining the SAR narrative 
to determine what, if any, additional information the reporting 
institution had uncovered. 
(5) Finally, we determined if FinCEN had referred the SAR for  
further investigation. 
While it was relatively easy to complete steps 1 and 2, difficulties 
arose with completing the other steps. In particular, with respect to step 3 it 
proved difficult to acquire actual records of most of the identified         
transactions and impossible to acquire client identifying and profiling    
information, although in a number of cases it proved possible to acquire 
sufficient descriptive information to make some tentative conclusions about 
possible indicators. With respect to step 4, while research was continuing, 
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FinCEN proposed a new regulation (which became final in December 2010) 
that changed previous law, which had permitted a financial institution to 
release an SAR, provided that it did not “tip off” persons involved in the 
suspicious transaction. (This would have been an impossibility in the cases 
we were reviewing because all the persons had already been prosecuted.) 
The new regulation made step 5 in our methodology impossible to          
implement. 
As a result, the findings of this study are more tentative than was 
expected at the outset. However, the study suggests some alternatives that 
might be pursued that could help rectify the deficiencies in the current study 
that arose due to the inability to implement steps 4 and 5. 
B. Steps 1 & 2: Terrorism Case Selection, Identification of those    
Involving Financial Transactions and Collection of Transaction 
Records 
In December, 2008, Jeffrey Breinholt88 of the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) provided the project with a list of 230 U.S. cases that he, in 
consultation with and other DOJ officials had identified as involving a  
prosecution in which the U.S. alleged that the defendants(s) may have been 
involved in supporting terrorism or some form of terrorist activity.89 This 
list did not include the 9/11 case, which had been reviewed extensively by 
the U.S. 9/11 Commission and which did not turn up any apparent          
terrorism-financing indicators. This list was supplemented in October, 2010 
with an additional thirty-three cases to bring the list up-to-date. 
By reviewing DOJ press releases, news stories, and published court 
opinions, researchers identified forty-seven cases as possibly involving  
terrorism financing. Each involved either deposit-taking institutions or 
money-transfer agents. Researchers then collected and reviewed relevant 
court documents that were either published or made available free of charge 
through the Internet. These often included pleadings and motions, including 
bills of indictment and requests for warrants, freezing orders, material    
witness orders, and supporting affidavits. On rare occasions, some evidence 
submitted during the trial was also located and reviewed. Of considerable 
help to locating such materials is The Nine Eleven Finding Answers    
Foundation (NEFA), which maintains a website that includes many        
publically available documents on terrorism-related criminal and civil    
  
 88 Mr. Breinholt has been Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Section and Coordinator, Ter-
rorist Financing Task Force of the U.S. Department of Justice.  
 89 In many of the prosecutions, charges were not brought for either terrorism or material 
support, but in all instances charges were brought for some other offence, including: making 
false statements; immigration fraud; money laundering (including structuring or operation or 
use of unlicensed MSBs); threats other than terrorist threats; hoaxes; and air violence. Mate-
rial witness orders that involved no criminal charge were also included. 
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cases.90 From the group of forty-seven, researchers identified thirty that 
might involve both terrorism financing and a regulated financial institution. 
For these cases, researchers attempted to collect and examine documents 
and evidence not published or available for free on the internet. 
Researchers first attempted to obtain copies of client identification, 
profiling information, and transaction records from the banks and transfer 
agents in question. However, these reporting persons refused to share such 
records, citing the expense involved in collecting and providing us with 
such information and the concern that doing so might breach FinCEN’s 
SAR confidentiality rules.91 They made this later point even though we did 
not mention SARs themselves and even though no law or regulation made 
reference to the confidentiality of information that may have given rise to 
the filing of an SAR. 
Failing in this attempt, researchers then turned to records made 
available as evidence in prosecution of the terrorism cases. In theory, all 
publicly available case documents, including all evidence submitted for 
trial, can be obtained in two ways: (1) in hard copy from the relevant court 
(mostly for cases that are older than ten years); or (2) through the online 
federal court filing and retrieval system known as PACER. However, in 
many cases the number of pages of documents filed from beginning to end 
run to the tens of thousands. The court keeps a docket of filings for each 
case, but the docket entries themselves rarely identify exactly what kind of 
evidence, if any, is included in the filing. As a result, it becomes necessary 
to individually examine documents to identify those that relate to financial 
transactions. For documents filed with the court in hard copy, this requires 
physically visiting the court, requesting documents from the court clerk, and 
reviewing them on-site. For most relevant documents filed through PACER, 
this requires downloading each page at a cost of $ 0.10 per page. 
After attempting and failing to identify relevant documents by     
reviewing court dockets filed on PACER, researchers contacted via e-mail 
and telephone92 those DOJ personnel who prosecuted each case for         
assistance identifying relevant documents. Follow-up e-mails and telephone 
calls were made where appropriate. Prosecutors had to divert their time 
from other pressing work to assist researchers with work that would not (at 
  
 90 See Featured Legal Cases, NINE ELEVEN FINDING ANSWERS [NEFA] FOUNDATION, 
http://nefafoundation.org//index.cfm?pageID=29 (last visited May 22, 2012) (providing a 
portal to domestic criminal and civil and international cases on terrorism). 
 91 Given the nature of the refusals given by the first few approached, researchers gave up 
without pursuing the rest, deeming any additional efforts to be pointless.  
 92 Each e-mail described the nature and purpose of the project, summarized the available 
details of the case, and requested any information regarding financial transactions, especially 
PACER document numbers. 
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least directly) assist in the prosecution of cases, current or future.93 Not  
surprisingly, in many instances prosecutors were not able to respond to  
requests for assistance.94 In many instances, prosecutors informed us that for 
various reasons (including decisions not to charge defendants with crimes 
requiring financial transaction evidence or the entrance of guilty pleas to 
such crimes prior to the introduction of evidence) no relevant documents 
were admitted into evidence, and therefore they could not be shared with 
researchers. As a result, only in a few cases have prosecutors been able to 
share with researchers actual documentary evidence of financial           
transactions. In those instances, however, thousands of pages representing 
tens of thousands of transactions have been provided. 
Of those thirty cases, researchers found sufficient financial           
information to draw conclusions in twenty-four. A description of these   
cases, and of the relevant information obtained with respect to financial 
transactions are included in the Annex.  
C. Step 3: Analysis of Transactions for Indicators 
As discussed above, in order to determine if a transaction is       
suspicious it is necessary for the financial institution to identify and profile 
the client, to monitor the client’s transactions, and to examine transactions. 
However, in the initial review of the thirty cases for evidence of suspicious 
transactions, it was not possible to consult client identification and profiling 
information. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of instances it was possible 
to take educated guesses, based on publicly available information           
concerning the client in question, to determine if payments would fit an 
assumed client profile as being legitimate. This is because most transactions 
fall into three types: (1) those that are too small to be consequential; (2) 
those that are consequential but that appear to be between individuals or 
entities with no obvious legitimate connection that would render the     
transaction suspicious; and (3) those that appear to be between individuals 
or entities with a legitimate reason to make the transaction. 
  
 93 Case Western Reserve University researchers discussed this matter with a number of 
prosecutors. Some noted that while the results of our research project might help future fi-
nancial institution compliance officers and/or investigators in identifying terrorism financing 
suspects, the results would be unlikely to help those who ultimately prosecuted those cases. 
Some also suggested that they believed that, from their experience, there were no “terrorism 
indicators,” and that the project was unlikely to be of any assistance to law enforcement.  
 94 In a few instances prosecutors had left the DOJ for private practice. In these cases they 
did respond to e-mail inquiries but were unable to assist in finding relevant documents.  
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D. Step 4: Review any SARs Filed 
As discussed above, part of a reporting institution’s preventive 
measures obligation is to examine any unusual transaction to determine if 
there is an actual suspicion that it concerns terrorism financing. Because the 
methods by which reporting persons implement these requirements are  
expensive and proprietary, they are understandably reticent to share any 
details. We sought instead to obtain copies of any SARs filed so that we 
could examine the narratives and determine if link analysis, reference to any 
publically available information on the clients, or typologies might have 
played a role in uncovering relevant indicator information. We were not 
successful. 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
states that “[t]he global war on terrorism and cutting off terrorist financing 
is a policy priority for the U.S. and its partners, working bilaterally and  
multilaterally through the U.N., the U.N. Security Council and its        
committees…and other multilateral fora.”95 Under § 5318(g) of the USA 
Patriot Act,96 a financial institution and its agents are prohibited from     
notifying any person who is the subject of an SAR either that an SAR was 
filed or of the circumstances surrounding the filing. Congress apparently 
included this provision in order to prevent the tipping off of launderers and 
terrorists, which could spoil any current or future investigation. There was, 
however, no prohibition on release of information that an SAR had been 
filed or of the SAR itself that applied to government authorities. The      
implementing regulations essentially restated the statutory language.97 Also, 
courts had held that SARs were not strictly confidential and that disclosure 
of an SAR in a case where the subject of the report has already been      
convicted will not compromise an ongoing law enforcement investigation, 
or provide information to a criminal wishing to evade detection.98 This was 
clearly the situation with respect to the cases we were investigating. 
Based on such policy, law, and precedent, researchers requested 
copies from the DOJ of any SARs filed with respect to the thirty cases that 
we had identified, but with any information concerning innocent persons 
redacted. Officials at the DOJ were sympathetic and prepared to release 
  
 95 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 
7701, 118 Stat. 3638, 3858 (2004). 
 96 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(A) (2006).  
 97 See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(k) (2011) (providing similar guidance in the administrative regu-
lation as in the enacting legislation). 
 98 See Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (noting 
that SAR disclosure poses a threat when a suspect is still at large); see also BizCapital & 
Indus. Corp. v. Comptroller of Currency, 467 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
SARs are not categorically privileged under certain circumstances). 
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redacted SARs to researchers, but then FinCEN issued a new regulation that 
prohibits private or public sector persons from revealing if an SAR was 
filed, or any contents of that SAR, to anyone in any circumstances.99 While 
there appears to be no statutory authority for such a regulation (and      
therefore that it may be ultra vires, the statute may therefore be invalid), its 
issuance prevented DOJ from releasing any redacted SARs to researchers. 
Because we were unable to review the SARs, it was impossible for 
researchers to obtain the information necessary to determine if financial 
institutions had in fact used their knowledge of customer information,    
customer transactions, and link analysis, typologies, etc. to conclude that a 
transaction was suspicious. It also made it impossible for researchers to 
determine if FinCEN had referred such SARs to law enforcement for further 
investigation, or if they had added actionable intelligence to the SARs that 
would suggest either money laundering or terrorism financing. 
E. Response to New Regulation Preventing Implementation of Step 4 
While the new Regulation prevents both public and private sectors 
from revealing if SARs have been filed or the contents of those SARs, it 
also made clear that “[w]ith respect to the SAR confidentiality provisions 
only, institutions may disclose underlying facts, transactions, and           
documents for any purpose, provided that no person involved in the     
transaction is notified and none of the underlying information reveals the 
existence of an SAR.”100 For this reason, financial institutions should no 
longer be concerned with SAR confidentiality issues, and they should only 
be concerned about the costs of releasing identification, profiling, and  
transaction documents. Financial institutions may, however, continue to be 
reticent about releasing any link analysis that might lead a reviewer to    
believe that an SAR had, in fact, been filed. 
In order to encourage reporting persons to release identification, 
profiling and transaction data with respect to the identified cases,            
researchers have approached a number of financial institutions and         
requested that they create a committee to assist the Counterterrorism Task 
Force in identifying terrorism financing methodologies (CACTF). The 
Committee would encourage reporting persons in question to release the 
relevant documents, and it would provide technical assistance where    
needed. We expect CACTF to be up and running by End May, 2011. 
  
 99 See FinCEN; Confidentiality of Suspicious Activity Reports, 75 Fed. Reg. 75593, 
75598 (Dec. 3, 2010) (to be codified as 31 C.F.R. § 103) (explaining exceptions for connect-
ed parties and certain other government officials).  
100 Id. (citations omitted). 
File: Gordon 2 Created on: 6/16/2012 12:46:00 PM Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:41:00 PM 
2012] TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS 795 
 
F. New Step 5: Review Documents released by Reporting Persons 
Researchers are working with the initial members of CACTF to 
plan a workshop sometime in the fall of 2011 to review any released      
documents. The workshop will include AML/CFT compliance officers from 
member banks. It is hoped that this conference will help deepen our       
understanding of the nature of the cases identified in this Report. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on assumptions concerning client identification and profiles, 
researchers examined transactions to determine if there was anything     
unusual in those transactions that would raise a suspicion of terrorism    
financing. In doing so, we did not indicate instances where a person was 
identifiable as a terrorist or terrorist organization, in that this was not an 
“indicator” but a fact. 
In the twenty-four cases where sufficient financial information was 
available to draw a conclusion, fourteen indicated instances of classic   
money laundering typologies, including placement, layering, integration, or 
an unlicensed money service business. Only three of these cases involved 
criminal proceeds, although an additional three appear to involve diversion 
of charitable donations to terrorists which could have, in effect, constituted 
theft of legitimate donations. In eight cases there was no suspicious      
transaction of any kind (other than a party to a transaction was a known 
terrorist), although in two of these, criminal proceeds were involved. Only 
one indicated a possible set of transactions that might be a unique indicator 
for terrorism financing. 
Terrorist financers appear to be using classic money laundering  
typologies regardless of whether they are trying to launder the proceeds of 
crime. It appears that they do so either to hide the origins of the funds or the 
recipient of the funds without leaving a directly traceable transaction      
between origin and recipient. In other words, they are acting in a fashion 
similar to that of former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, who used classic 
structuring transactions to hide that he was making payments to             
prostitutes.101 
Therefore, simply by using standard anti-money laundering          
typologies financial institutions should have been able to identify fourteen 
of the twenty-four instances of terrorism financing as being suspicious, 
though not on their face to raise suspicion of terrorism financing. What we 
can tell from examining the cases is that it might have been possible for the 
  
101 See generally Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists?, supra note 1 (explaining how SARs ex-
posed governor Eliot Spitzer’s political scandal involving money laundering and prostitu-
tion). 
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reporting institution to have discovered terrorism connections during the 
examination process, or for FinCEN to have done so when receiving the 
SAR. However, because researchers did not have access to this information 
it is impossible to determine at this time. 
The one case indicating a possible set of transactions that might be 
a unique indicator for terrorism financing involved repeat purchases from a 
military equipment store. To determine if this should raise a suspicion of 
terrorism finance, it would be necessary to see if such purchases are, in fact, 
sufficiently unusual to distinguish them in a meaningful way from non-
terrorism related purchases. This could perhaps be done by comparing them 
with other purchases from similar stores. Researchers will attempt to locate 
such information for the final Report. 
 
SUMMARY TABLE  
DATA, TYPE OF TRANSACTION(S), SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION 
Case 
# 
Data Available Type of Transaction(s) Suspicious Transac-
tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
1 Detailed information 
on wire and check 
transactions. 
Multiple significant wire 
transfers among charities 
with bank accounts in 
various jurisdictions; final 
withdrawal of cash trans-
ferred to terrorist organi-
zation. No obvious legit-
imate connection. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Layering, inte-
gration. 
PC: No. 
2 General description 
only. 
Single significant wire 
transfer from a personal 
bank account in the US to 
a personal bank account 
in Canada. No obvious 
legitimate connection. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering. 
PC: Yes. 
3 No description. Unknown. Unknown. 
4 General description 
only. 
Cash deposits to personal 
bank account followed by 
a series of small denomi-
nated checks paid to a 
business unrelated to the 
payor. No obvious legiti-
mate connection. 
 
Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering, possible inte-
gration. 
PC: No. 
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Case 
# 
Data Available Type of Transaction(s) Suspicious Transac-
tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
5 
 
 
General description 
only. 
Large wire transfers from 
personal accounts in one 
jurisdiction to multiple 
accounts in another. No 
obvious legitimate con-
nection. 
Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering and/or unli-
censed MSB. 
PC: No. 
6 Detailed information 
on wire and check 
transactions. 
Wire and check transfers 
from company account 
controlled by one person 
in one jurisdiction to a 
personal account con-
trolled by the same person 
in another jurisdiction.  
ST: No. 
PC No. 
7 General description 
only. 
Significant cash deposits 
and wire transfers from 
various personal accounts 
to a single person’s ac-
count, followed by trans-
fers to a charity in another 
jurisdiction, followed by 
further transfers to multi-
ple accounts in other ju-
risdictions. No obvious 
legitimate connection. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering, possible inte-
gration, and/or unli-
censed MSB. 
PC: No. 
8 General description 
only. 
Wire or check transac-
tions from one charity to 
numerous accounts of 
unknown control, receipt 
of a very large amount 
from a foreign account of 
unknown control to a 
charity. No obvious legit-
imate connection. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Possible place-
ment (depending on 
nature of deposits), 
layering. 
PC: Diversion of 
charitable donations. 
 
9 General description 
only. 
Significant cross border 
wire transaction from 
company in one jurisdic-
tion with possible owner-
ship/control held by pos-
sible terrorists to numer-
ous accounts in other 
jurisdictions of unknown 
control. No obvious legit-
imate connection. 
ST: Yes.  
 ML: Possible place-
ment (depending on 
nature of deposits), 
layering. 
PC: No. 
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Case 
# 
Data Available Type of Transaction(s) Suspicious Transac-
tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
10 Sale of stolen tele-
phone cards. 
Unknown. ST: Unknown. 
PC: Yes. 
11 General description 
only. 
Cash deposits, large inter-
national wire transfers 
from personal bank ac-
counts under false name 
to money transfer compa-
nies with unknown ac-
count names/owner or 
controller. No obvious 
legitimate connection. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering, and/or unli-
censed MSB.  
PC: Yes. 
12 General description 
only. 
Large number of cash 
deposits under different 
business names at various 
banks to a single account 
at one business with no 
obvious business connec-
tion, large wire transfers 
from that business to dif-
ferent bank accounts in 
other jurisdictions. No 
obvious legitimate con-
nection. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering, and/or unli-
censed MSB.  
PC: No. 
13 General description 
only. 
Numerous deposits made 
to various individual ac-
counts, then transferred to 
single accounts in differ-
ent jurisdiction, then 
checks paid to individuals 
in a third jurisdiction. No 
obvious legitimate con-
nection. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering, possible inte-
gration. 
PC: Diversion of 
charitable donations. 
 
14 Detailed information. Small amounts sent via 
wire transfers from a bank 
account in one jurisdiction 
to various individual bank 
accounts in another juris-
diction. No obvious legit-
imate connection. 
ST: No. 
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Case 
# 
Data Available Type of Transaction(s) Suspicious Transac-
tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
15 Some detailed infor-
mation on wire and 
check transactions, 
some actual transac-
tion records. 
Large international wire 
transfers from various 
charitable and personal 
accounts in one jurisdic-
tion to personal accounts 
in another jurisdiction 
(some in the name of the 
same individual) in anoth-
er jurisdiction. No obvi-
ous legitimate connection 
in all cases. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Layering, possi-
ble integration. 
PC: Diversion of 
charitable donations. 
 
16 General description 
only. 
Small MSB wire transfers 
by a person in one juris-
diction to a person in 
another jurisdiction. 
ST: No.  
PC: No. 
17 General description 
only. 
Large bank transfers from 
accounts in one jurisdic-
tion to multiple accounts 
held by one person at 
multiple banks in another 
jurisdiction. Large num-
bers of transfers from one 
personal bank account in 
that jurisdiction to many 
different recipient ac-
counts in the same juris-
diction. No obvious legit-
imate connection. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Layering, possi-
ble integration.  
PC: Unclear. 
18 General description 
only. 
Direct bank transfers from 
a charity in one jurisdic-
tion to two charities in 
another jurisdiction. 
ST: No. 
PC: Diversion of 
charitable donations. 
19 Detailed information. Large transfers from a 
number of individual bank 
accounts in one country to 
a number of individual 
bank accounts in other 
countries. No obvious 
legitimate connection. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Placement, lay-
ering. 
PC: Yes. 
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Case 
# 
Data Available Type of Transaction(s) Suspicious Transac-
tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
20 General description 
only. 
Wire transfers from per-
sonal accounts in one 
jurisdiction to the person-
al accounts of the same 
individual in other juris-
dictions. Large wire trans-
fers from one personal 
account in the US to the 
personal account of an 
unconnected individual in 
another jurisdiction. No 
obvious legitimate con-
nection? 
ST: Possible. 
ML: Large transfers 
to unrelated person 
may not fit client 
profile raising suspi-
cion of layering. 
PC: No. 
 
21 No description. Unknown. ST: Unknown. 
No. 
22 Some detailed infor-
mation. 
Large wire transfers from 
company account in one 
jurisdiction to account in 
another. Because a sting 
operation, unknown if 
recipient account was 
profiled by bank. 
ST: Unknown. 
PC: Presumed no. 
23 General description 
only. 
Size and origin of MSB 
wire transfers unknown.  
ST: Unknown.  
PC: Yes. 
24 Court documents 
provide detailed in-
formation on wire and 
check transactions 
including payment 
records. 
Small deposits to charity 
bank account in one juris-
diction, wire transfers to 
large number of unrelated 
individual bank accounts 
in another jurisdiction, 
then wire transfers to 
large number of unrelated 
individual bank accounts 
in various additional ju-
risdictions, then cash 
withdrawn. No obvious 
legitimate connection. 
ST: Yes. 
ML: Layering, inte-
gration. 
PC: No. 
25 General description 
only. 
Deposits. ST: No. 
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Case 
# 
Data Available Type of Transaction(s) Suspicious Transac-
tion(s) [ST]? 
If yes, type 
Proceeds of crime 
[PC]? 
26 General description 
only. 
Cross border payments of 
unknown type, single 
small cross border wire 
transfer. 
ST: Unknown. 
 
 
27 General description 
only. 
Small number of small 
MSB wire transfers from 
one jurisdiction to several 
individuals in multiple 
jurisdictions.  
ST: No. 
ST: No. 
28 General description 
only. 
Fraudulent credit card 
application, credit card 
payments.  
ST: No. 
PC: Yes. 
29 General description 
only. 
Debit card payments to a 
designated terrorist organ-
ization and to high-tech 
military equipment com-
panies; medium sized 
cross-border wire transfer 
to an unknown person. 
 
ST: Possible. 
TF: Repeat purchases 
from military equip-
ment store? 
PC: No. 
 
30 General description 
only. 
Medium-sized cross bor-
der wire transfer. 
ST: No. 
PC: No. 
 
  
 
